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Abstract
We develop a bottom-up approach to truth-value semantics for clas-
sical logic of partial terms based on equality, and apply it to prove the
conservativity of the addition of partial description and selection func-
tions, independently of any strictness assumption.
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0.1 Introduction
We assume the reader is familiar with the natural deduction system for classical
first order logic, conceived as the result of the direct analysis of actual math-
ematical reasoning, as presented by Gentzen in [3]. At the same time we ask
her/him to leave aside, for a moment, the now standard classical set theoretic
formulation of the notion of logical consequence. By classical logic of partial
terms based on equality we mean the standard natural deduction system, with
the proviso, of a semantical nature, that not all terms are assumed to be neces-
sarily denoting; a feature that is syntactically reflected by the restriction of the
usual ∀-elimination and ∃-introduction rules, as formulated in [12], to variables
or individual parameters only. On the other hand, that a term t is denoting is
expressed by the assumption ∃x(x = t), for x not occurring in t, in agreement
with Quine’s Thesis1, as originally proposed in [10] and [6]. Truth-valued se-
mantics has been extensively investigated by H. Leblanc, among others, see [7],
∗Work supported by funds PRIN-/MIUR. The author is grateful to the referee for very
helpful comments and suggestions.
1So christened in [10] and expressed by Quine’s dictum from [13], “to be is to be the value
of a variable”.
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[8] and especially [9], which presents it as the result of a progressive simplifica-
tion of the standard set theoretic semantics, first to countable models, then to
Henkin’s models and finally to no model at all. Quite to the opposite, we wish
to show that truth-value semantics can be approached from below, so to speak,
by following the search of the simplest mathematical means by which one can es-
tablish that a proposition is not deducible from others, by the application of the
given natural deduction rules, if that is indeed the case. We will explain to what
extent that approach determines the usual truth tables for the propositional con-
nectives and how it leads to truth-value semantics, when quantifiers are involved.
A distinguished feature of our treatment, with respect to Leblanc’s, is that it
deals with first order languages endowed with function symbols, which, apart
from its intrinsic interest, is clearly necessary if tv-semantics for partial logic has
to be applied to show the conservativity of the addition of partial description
and selection functions. As in [4] and [12], we refer to the articulation of a first
order language in which, beyond a countable supply of variables, meant to be
used for quantification, one has also an infinite supply of individual parameters,
meant to remain free names for generic objects of whatever (non empty) domain
one happens to be talking about. Once truth-value semantics (tv-semantics, for
short) is defined, we will sketch a proof that it is indeed fully adequate, namely
that not only our motivating goal, namely correctness, but also completeness
holds. Then we establish the Extension Property, which will be basic for all
later developments. The basic idea to deal semantically with the undefinedness
of a pure term t with respect to a truth-value valuation (tv-valuation for short)
v, is simply to say that t is non denoting with respect to v if for all individual
parameters a, v(a = t) = f . Our main purpose is then to employ tv-semantics
to show that the above logical framework is appropriate to deal with non empty
domains, with a language in which individual parameters stand for objects of
the domain but more general terms, such as −1 or 1/(a− a), when the natural
or the real numbers are involved, need not denote any object whatsoever. See
[2] for a more extended and very illuminating discussion. In fact, by using tv-
semantics, we will prove the conservativity of the addition of partial selection
and description functions, also when the strictness axioms, to the effect that: 1)
all constants are denoting, 2) if ft1 . . . tn is denoting, then t1, . . . , tn are denoting
as well and 3) for p other than =, if pt1 . . . tn holds, then t1, . . . , tn are denoting,
are added to the underlying logical framework. To obtain our conservativity
results, we have obviously to take into account all possible tv-valuations: those
for which there is a non denoting term can be disposed with by choosing one
such term. For the remaining ones, to be called totally denoting tv-valuations,
we have to enrich the language with a new constant: the undefined ↑, and show
that the given valuation can be extended to the new language in a way that ac-
tually leaves ↑ undefined. To deal with the strictness axioms, we have to adopt
a corresponding type of tv-valuation and show that the Extension Property ap-
plies to them as well. The conservativity of the addition of partial selection
functions and partial description functions, with or without strictness axioms,
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then follows by a straightforward correctness/completeness argument. Finally
it is to be noted that totally denoting valuations are elementarily equivalent to
classical set theoretic structures (with total functions interpreting function sym-
bols) and strict valuations are elementarily equivalent to set theoretic structures
with partial functions interpreting function symbols. As such, totally denoting
tv-valuations constitute a natural intermediate step for the introduction of what
has become the standard semantics for classical first order logic, with complete-
ness achieved as a simple corollary. Correctness, on the other hand, crucially
depends on proving the substitution lemmas (which, presumably, involves the
tedious details mentioned in Gumb’s obituary of Leblanc [5]). 2
0.2 Pure terms and formulae
DEFINITION 0.1 Given a first order language L,
a) A term t of L is pure if no variable occurs in t,
b) A formula F of L is pure if no variable occurs free in F ,
The collection of pure terms of L will be denoted by PureTermL.
In particular, sentences are pure formulae. This terminology is inspired by
Gentzen’s suggestion in [3] 3 and in [14] p. 70.4
0.3 Natural deduction systems for partial logic
As for the deductive apparatus we refer to the natural deduction system, which
we denote by Nc, in which the ∀-elimination and ∃-introduction rule take the
restricted form
∀xF F{x/y}
F{x/y} ∃xF
where y is either a free variable or an individual parameter. A deduction is said
to be pure when it involves pure formulae only, in particular in its ∀-elimination
and ∃-introduction, y must be a parameter. G1, . . . , Gn✄cF denotes that there
is a deduction in Nc with conclusion F and active assumptions included among
G1, . . . , Gn.
2Leblanc found truth-value semantics to be a useful teaching device enabling students to
grasp more easily fundamental semantic concepts, because it abstracted from tedious details
in standard, set-theoretic semantics.
3“rein logische Formel”
4The concept of a formula is ordinarily used in a more general sense; the special case
defined [above] might thus perhaps described as a purely logical formula.
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0.4 A ”bottom-up” approach to truth-value semantics
At the propositional level, when required to explain why, for example, A does
not follow from A → B and B, one usually provides examples taken from the
ordinary or mathematical language, like letting A be “the car runs out of gas”
and B be “the car stops”, where all is relevant is our persuasion that if A is
true then B is true as well, but if B is true A need not necessarily be true.
That naturally leads to the idea of a valuation of the propositional atoms of the
propositions we are investigating, into at least two values. Our goal of showing
that F does not follow from G1, . . . , Gn is reached if:
• a method of computing values for compound statements is found such that
one specific value, say t, is preserved by deductions, and a valuation v of
the propositional atoms in G1, . . . , Gn, F is found, such that G1, . . . , Gn
takes the value t, but F does not.
Clearly for that to work at least two values are needed. Classical propositional
semantics makes the minimal choice of two values, say t and f . Then, as dis-
cussed, for example, in [11] and [1], letting ✄pc be the restriction of ✄c obtained
when only the application of propositional rules is allowed, the rules for ∧,
the introduction rules for ∨ and →, together with the relations A,¬A ✄pc B,
A,¬B✄pc¬(A→ B), determine the classical truth table for ∧, half of the truth
table for ¬ and three-fourth of the truth tables for ∨ and →. On the ground of
the further relations ¬A,¬B✄pc¬(A∨B) and ¬A✄pcA→ B, it then suffices to
assume that ¬A takes the value t, whenever A takes the value f , to obtain the
classical truth tables.5 When it comes to quantifiers we have that v(F{x/a})
(F{x/a} pure), for a an individual parameter, has to take the value t, whenever
v(∀xF ) takes the value t, because of the ∀-elimination rule. Similarly v(∃xF )
has to take the value t, if for some parameter a, v(F{x/a}) takes the value t,
because of the ∃-introduction rule. As we will show, an appropriate solution to
our problem is obtained by simply reversing the last two implications, namely
stating that it is sufficient, for v(∀xF ) to take the value t, that for every indi-
vidual parameter a of the language, v(F{x/a}) takes the value t. And similarly
that it is necessary for v(∃xF ) to take the value t, that for some parameter a,
v(F{x/a}) takes the value t.
0.5 Truth-value valuations
DEFINITION 0.2 Let L be a first order language. A truth-value valuation
(tv-valuation for short) of L is a total function v from the collection of pure
atomic formulae of L into {t, f} such that v(⊥) = f .
A tv-valuation v of L determines a unique extension v¯ to the pure formulae
of L, according to the classical two-valued truth tables and the conditions:
5Notice that none of the rules and relations concerning ✄pc which are being used is specific
to classical logic.
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• v¯(∀xH) = t if and only it for every parameter a, v¯(H{x/a}) = t.
• v¯(∃xH) = t if and only it for some parameter a, v¯(H{x/a}) = t.
DEFINITION 0.3 v tv-satisfies a pure formula F , if v¯(F ) = t; F is tv-valid
if every tv-valuation v of L(F ) satisfies F and F is a tv-semantic consequence
of the pure formulae G1, . . . , Gn, F if every tv-valuation v of L(G1, . . . , Gn, F ),
which tv-satisfies G1, . . . , Gn, tv-satisfies F as well.
0.6 Correctness and completeness for tv-semantics
Correctness and completeness of the tv-semantics determined as above by the
tv-valuations, for the pure system Nc, holds.
THEOREM 0.1 For G1, . . . , Gn, F pure formulae, G1, . . . , Gn ✄c F if and
only F is a tv-semantic consequence of G1, . . . , Gn
Proof Correctness is proved by a straightforward induction on the height
of deductions in pure Nc. The only non entirely trivial case occurs when the
deduction ends with a ∀ : I or ∃ : E. For example in the former case, letting D
be the immediate subderivation with conclusion H{x/a}, given any parameter
b of L(G1, . . . , Gn, F ), if b is used as proper in (some ∀ : I or ∃ : E rule applied
in) D, we first rename the occurrences of b in D by a parameter c new to D
and then replace a by b throughout. The result is a deduction of H{x/b}. By
the induction hypothesis, any tv-valuation, which satisfies G1, . . . , Gn, satisfies
H{x/b} as well. But that means that it satisfies ∀xH , as desired. Complete-
ness can be proved, for example, by applying the semantic tableaux method to
pure formulae and considering only parameters in the γ-reductions. If F is a
consequence of G1, . . . , Gn, the systematic tableaux procedure, initialized with
t.G1, . . . , t.Gn, f.F , returns a closed tableaux from which a deduction D of F
from G1, . . . , Gn can be obtained. Furthermore the variables which have bound
occurrences in D are exactly those which occur bound in G1, . . . , Gn, F . ✷.
Note To have a correct and complete semantics for general formulae it suf-
fices to state that F is a tv- semantic consequence of G1, . . . , Gn if for some
substitution θ = {x1/a1, . . . , xn/an}, where x1, . . . , xn are the variables which
have free occurrences in G1, . . . , Gn, F , and a1, . . . , an are distinct parameters
not occurring in G1, . . . , Gn, F , we have that Fθ is a pure semantic conse-
quence of G1θ, . . . , Gnθ. Correctness holds since from a deduction D of F from
G1, . . . , Gn, after renaming the parameters among a1, . . . , an, which are used
as proper in D, one obtains a deduction of Fθ from G1θ, . . . , Gnθ, simply by
replacing x1, . . . , xn by a1, . . . , an throughout D. As for completeness, we first
note that its assumption and conclusion are invariant under renaming of bound
variables. Therefore we may assume that no variable occurs both free and bound
in G1, . . . , Gn, F . Since, by assumption, Fθ is a pure semantic consequence of
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G1θ, . . . , Gnθ, we may obtain a deduction of Fθ from G1θ, . . . , Gnθ in pure Nc,
which is transformed into a deduction of F from G1, . . . , Gn simply by replacing
a1, . . . , an with x1, . . . , xn throughout. An immediate consequence is that the
definition of tv-semantic consequence for general formulae does not depend on
the choice of θ.
0.7 Equality
Following [6], as axioms for equality we take reflexivity, namely ∀(t = t), where t
is assumed to be parameter free and ∀ denotes universal closure, and the axiom
of substitutivity of the form
∀(r = s→ (F{v/r} → F{v/s}))
with r, s and F parameter free. The two schemata of reflexivity and substitu-
tivity will be denoted by Rfl=s and Sbst=s. Rfl=sand Sbst=s are easily seen
to be equivalent over Nc to Rfl
=s and:
Symm=s ∀(r = s→ s = r),
T rans=s ∀(r = s→ (s = t→ r = t)),
Cng=sp ∀(r1 = s1 ∧ . . . ∧ rn = sn → (p(r1, . . . , rn)→ p(s1, . . . , sn)))
Cng=sf ∀(r1 = s1 ∧ . . . ∧ rn = sn → f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(s1, . . . , sn))
for any n-ary relation and function symbol p and f , where all the terms shown
are parameter free. N=c results from Nc by allowing any formula in Rfl
s and
Sbsts to be considered as a discharged assumption.
NoteThat the equality axioms, formulated for variables only, namely ∀x(x =
x) and ∀x∀y(x = y → (F{v/x} → F{v/y}), are not sufficient for a satisfactory
development of the logic of partial terms, was first noticed in [6].
0.8 tv-semantics for N=
c
DEFINITION 0.4 A tv-valuation with equality of L is a tv-valuation of L,
which satisfies the axioms in Rfl=s, Symm=s, Trans=s and Cng=s.
In other words, v is a tv-valuation with equality if the binary relation {(r, s) :
v(r = s) = t}, to be denoted by =v, is a congruence relation with respect to the
canonical interpretation of the function symbols {((t1, . . . , tn), f(t1, . . . , tn))}
and the relations pv = {(t1, . . . , tn) : v(p(t1, . . . , tn)) = t}, for p relation symbol
in L, where t1, . . . , tn range over PureTermL.
Correctness and completeness for N=c holds with respect to the notion of
tv-semantic consequence based on tv-valuations with equality.
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THEOREM 0.2 For G1, . . . , Gn, F pure formulae, G1, . . . , Gn ✄
=
c F if and
only if every tv-valuation with equality of L(G1, . . . , Gn, F ) which tv-satisfies
G1, . . . , Gn, tv-satisfies F as well.
Proof Correctness is an immediate consequence of the correctness of Nc.
Completeness can be achieved through the tableaux method, by interleaving
the logical reduction steps with steps in which one appends, one after the other,
the countably many judgments of the form t.E where E belongs to Rfl=s,
Symm=s, Trans=s or Congs. ✷
Extension to general formulae can be obtained as for Nc.
0.9 The extension property
The following property will be our basic tool for dealing with tv-semantics for
Nc and N
=
c .
PROPOSITION 0.1 Extension Property
If v is a tv-valuation of L (with equality) and L ⊂ L′, then there is a map
Φ from PureTermL′ onto PureTermL and a valuation (with equality) v
′ of L′
such that:
1) for a term t of L with variables among x1, . . . , xk and pure terms r
′
1, . . . , r
′
k
of L′
Φ(t{x1/r
′
1, . . . , xk/r
′
k}) = t{x1/Φ(r
′
1), . . . , xk/Φ(r
′
k)},
in particular if t is a pure term of L, Φ(t) = t,
2) for a formula F of L with free variables among x1, . . . , xk and pure terms
r′1, . . . , r
′
k of L
′
v¯′(F{x1/r
′
1, . . . , xk/r
′
k}) = v¯(F{x1/Φ(r
′
1), . . . , xk/Φ(r
′
k)}),
in particular if F is a pure formula of L, then v¯′(F ) = v¯(F ).
Proof For every n-ary function symbol f ∈ L′ \ L, fix a total function
f : PureTerm nL → PureTermL (for n = 0, f is either a constant or
a parameter and f is a pure term, say f0, of L), which, in case v is a tv-
valuation with equality, is congruent with respect to =v (for example f can be
any constant function). If t is a parameter or a constant of L, let Φ(t) = t. If
t′ is a parameter or a constant in L′ \ L, let Φ(t′) = t′0. If t
′ is g(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)
with g in L, let Φ(t′) = g(Φ(t′1), . . . ,Φ(t
′
n)), finally, if t
′ is f(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) let
Φ(t′) = f(Φ(t′1), . . . ,Φ(t
′
n)). Furthermore for p, n-ary relation symbol of L let
v′(p(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)) = v(p(Φ(t
′
1), . . . ,Φ(t
′
n))
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and, for q n-ary relation symbol in L′ \ L, let v′(q(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)) be defined ar-
bitrarily provided v′(q(s′1, . . . , s
′
n)) = t, whenever v
′(q(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)) = t and
v′(t′1 = s
′
1) = t, . . . , v
′(t′n = s
′
n) = t.
1) and 2) are easily proved by induction on the height of t and F respectively.
✷
Since, in the previous proof, it is the choice of f which determines v′, we will
say that v′ is the extension of v based on f .
Remark The notion of tv-valuation can be relativized to any fixed subset
P0 of the set of parameters of L, assumed to be non empty, in case L has no
constant, by taking into account only the formulae whose parameters belong
to P0 and considering only parameters in P0 in defining the meaning of the
quantifiers. If P0 is infinite, the proof of correctness remains unchanged. If P0
is finite, correctness can be established along the lines of the previous proof. In
fact if v0 is a valuation restricted to any set of parameters P0 which satisfies F ,
then it suffices to note that v0 can be extended to a valuation v
′
0 of L(F ), which
still satisfies F , by mapping all the parameters which do non belong to P0 into
any one of the parameters in P0.
Thus, for example, the tv-valuation restricted to {a, b},
v0 = {(p(a, a), t), (p(b, b), t), (p(a, b), f), (p(b, a), f), ((a = a), t),
((b = b), t), ((a = b), f), ((b = a), f)}
which satisfies ∀x∃yp(x, y), but does not satisfy ∃x∀yp(x, y), suffices to show
that in N=c one cannot deduce the latter sentence from the former. Similarly
the tv-valuation restricted to {a},
{(p(c), t), (p(a), f), (a = a, t), (c = c, t), (a = c, f), (c = a, f)},
for c a constant, suffices to show that in N=c , ∃xp(x) cannot be deduced from
p(c), and the tv-valuation restricted to {a}:
{(p(fn(a), fn+1(a)), t) : n ∈ N} ∪ {(p(fn(a), fm(a)), f) : m 6= n+ 1}
∪{(fn(a) = fn(a), t) : n ∈ N} ∪ {(fn(a) = fm(a), f) : n 6= m},
where f0(a) denotes a itself, suffices to show that ∀x∃yp(x, y) is not deducible
from ∀xp(x, f(x)). On the other hand completeness for tv-valuations restricted
to finite sets of parameters clearly fails. For example ∃xp(x, x) is not derivable
in N=c from ∀x∃yp(x, y) and ∀x∀y∀z(p(x, y) ∧ p(y, z) → p(x.z), although it
is satisfied by any tv-valuation restricted to a finite set of parameters, which
satisfies the latter two sentences.
0.10 Totally denoting valuations
Notation t ↓ denotes the formula ∃y y = t, for y any variable not occurring in
t.
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The usual natural deduction system with equality, in which ∀-elimination
and ∃-introduction can be applied to any substitutable term, is easily seen to
be equivalent to N=c , provided ∀(t ↓) is allowed as a discharged assumption, for
any term t. We denote with N↓=c the resulting deduction system. N
↓=
c is clearly
equivalent toN=c , provided formulae of the form c ↓ and ∀x1, . . . , xnf(x1, . . . , xn) ↓,
for all the constant c and function symbol f of the language, are allowed as dis-
charged assumptions.
DEFINITION 0.5 A tv-valuation with equality v for L is said to be totally
denoting if for every pure term t of L, v tv-satisfies t ↓, namely there is a
parameter a such that v(a = t) = t.
PROPOSITION 0.2 A tv-valuation v for L with equality is totally denoting
if and only if every constant of L is denoting, and for every n-ary function
symbol f and n-tuple of parameters a1, . . . , an, f(a1, . . . , an) is denoting.
Proof By a straightforward induction on the height of terms. ✷
THEOREM 0.3 Correctness and completeness for N↓=c holds with respect to
the notion of tv-semantic consequence based on totally denoting tv-valuations.
Proof Immediate from the above propositions ✷.
Note To every totally denoting tv-valuation v for L there corresponds an
elementarily equivalent set theoretic interpretation Iv. The domain D
Iv of Iv
is the set of parameters of L. The interpretation of a constant symbols in Iv is
a parameter a, such that v(a = c) = t. Similarly the interpretation of an n-ary
function symbol f is a total function:
f Iv = {((a1, . . . .an), b) : v(b = f(a1, . . . , an)) = t}.
Finally, for any relation symbol p of L,
pIv = {(a1, . . . , an) : v(p(a1, . . . , an)) = t}.
Let τ be any assignment of elements of DIv to variables and parameters which
leaves all the parameters fixed, so that, under τ , the value of any pure term t
is t itself. A straightforward induction shows that if F is a pure formula of L,
then v¯(F ) = t if and only if Iv, τ |= F . As a consequence for every sentence F
of L, v¯(F ) = t if and only if Iv |= F , which is what we mean by saying that v
and Iv are elementarily equivalent. The quotient of Iv with respect to =
v is a
normal structure elementarily equivalent to Iv, therefore to v. The completeness
theorem for (the ordinary set theoretic semantics) of N↓=c is thus an immediate
consequence of the completeness of tv-semantics with equality for N↓=c .
9
PROPOSITION 0.3 The Extension Property holds also for the totally denot-
ing valuations.
Proof If v is totally denoting and v′ is an extension of v to L′, then v′ is also
totally denoting since v¯′(∃x(x = t′)) = v¯(∃x(x = Φ(t′)) and v¯(∃x(x = Φ(t′)) =
t, because Φ(t′) is a pure term of L and v is totally denoting. ✷
0.11 Introducing the undefined ↑
PROPOSITION 0.4 A totally denoting tv-valuation v of L can be extended
to a tv-valuation v↑ with equality of the language L+ ↑, where ↑ is a constant
not belonging to L, such that for every pure formula F of L, v¯(F ) = v¯↑(F ) and
↑ is non denoting with respect to v↑.
Proof We set v↑(r = s) = t if and only if r = s belongs to the smallest
set of equalities between pure terms of L+ ↑, which contains all the equal-
ities t′ = t′ and r = s such that v(r = s) = t and furthermore contains
f(r1, . . . , rn) = f(s1, . . . , sn) whenever for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n it already contains
ri = si. On all the remaining pure atomic formulae which contain ↑, v
↑ takes
the value f and v↑(A) = v(A) for every pure atomic formula of L. The claim
follows by a straightforward induction on the height of F . To prove that v↑ is
a valuation with equality it suffices to show that v↑(r1 = s1 ∧ . . . ∧ rn = sn →
(p(r1, . . . , rn) → p(s1, . . . , sn))) = t. If all of r1, . . . , sn belong to L, that holds
since v↑ agrees with v, which is a tv-valuation with equality. Thus let us assume
that, for example ↑ occurs in si. Then, by definition, v
↑(p(s1, . . . , sn)) = f , and
we have to show that also v↑(p(r1, . . . , rn)) = f . That follows from the fact that
if ↑ occurs in si and v
↑(ri = si) = t, then ↑ occurs also in ri. As a matter of
fact we have that if v↑(r = s) = t and ↑ occurs in s then ↑ occurs also in r
and conversely, as it follows immediately from the definition of v↑ on equalities.
Obviously that guaranties also that ↑ cannot be denoting. ✷
0.12 Strictness
DEFINITION 0.6 Let N=sc be the result of adding to N
=
c the following strict-
ness axioms:
1) c ↓
2) ∀(f(t1, . . . , tn) ↓→ t1 ↓ ∧ . . . ∧ tn ↓)
3) ∀(p(t1, . . . , tn) → t1 ↓ ∧ . . . ∧ tn ↓) for every relation symbol p other than
=, and t1, . . . , tn parameter free.
A strict tv-valuation of L is a tv-valuation of L with equality which satisfies the
strictness axioms.
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In 3) we have to leave aside =, since otherwise, from the adoption of t = t as
an axiom, it would follow that every t is defined. Thus our notion of strictness
is more relaxed than the one usually adopted when the existence predicate is
taken as primitive (see [2] for example).
The proof of correctness and completeness of the semantics based on totally
denoting tv-valuations for N=c can be easily adapted to establish the following:
THEOREM 0.4 Correctness and completeness for N=sc holds with respect to
the notion of tv-semantic consequence based on strict tv-valuations.
PROPOSITION 0.5 The Extension Property holds also for strict tv-valuations,
provided the extension is based on functions f which are strict, namely satisfy
the following condition:
a) if v(f(r1, . . . , rn) ↓) = t, then v(r1 ↓) = t, . . . , v(rn ↓) = t.
Proof If v is strict and v′ is an extension of v to L′ based on a function
f satisfying condition a), then v′ is also strict. For, assume v¯′(f(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) ↓
) = t, namely v¯′(∃x(x = f(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)) = t. If f ∈ L
′ \ L by the Extension
Property it follows that v¯(∃x(x = f(Φ(t′1), . . . ,Φ(t
′
n))) = t. By the strict-
ness of f , it follows that Φ(t′1) ↓, . . . ,Φ(t
′
n) ↓, namely v¯(∃x1(x1 = Φ(t
′
1))) =
t, . . . , v¯(∃xn(x1 = Φ(t
′
n))) = t, from which, by the Extension Property again,
we may conclude that v¯′(∃x1(x1 = t
′
1)) = t, . . . , v¯
′(∃xn(xn = t
′
n)) = t, namely
v¯′(t′1 ↓) = t, . . . , v¯
′(t′n ↓) = t, as required for v
′ to be strict. The case in which
f ∈ L or v¯′(p(t′1, . . . , t
′
n)) = t, for p other than =, is entirely similar. ✷
Note As for totally denoting tv-valuations, to every strict valuation v of
L there corresponds an elementarily equivalent (partial) set theoretic interpre-
tation Iv of L. D
Iv is still the set of parameters of L but f Iv is, in general,
a partial function. For a given assignment σ of elements of DIv to variables
and parameters, the value σ(t) which t takes under σ is an element of DIv iff
tσ is a denoting term, namely v(tσ ↓) = t. I, σ |= F is defined by letting
I, σ |= r = s iff v(σ(r), σ(s)) = t (even if σ(r) or σ(s) does not belong to DIv );
for p other that =, Iv, σ |= p(t1, . . . , tn) if and only if σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn) belong
to DIv and (σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) ∈ p
Iv (namely v(p(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) = t)). For
compound formulae Iv, σ |= F is defined as usual. For every pure formula F of
L and assignment τ , which leaves the parameters fixed, v¯(F ) = t if and only
if Iv, τ |= F , so that for a sentence F , v¯(F ) = t if and only if Iv |= F . For, if
F is of the form p(t1, . . . tn), from v¯(F ) = t, by the strictness of v, it follows
that t1, . . . , tn are all denoting terms, so that τ(t1), . . . , τ(tn) belong to D
Iv ,
and (τ(t1), . . . , τ(tn)) ∈ p
Iv so that Iv, τ |= F . As a consequence we have the
completeness of N=sc with respect to partial set theoretic interpretations.
Note If a tv-valuation v is extended into v↓, rather than into v¯, by using
the clauses:
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a) v↓(∀xH) = t iff for every pure term t, v↓(H{x/t}) = t.
b) v↓(∃xH) = t iff for some pure term t, v↓(H{x/t}) = t.
then a straightforward modification of the previous arguments shows that the
resulting semantics is correct and complete with respect to the usual natural
deduction system, without equality, in which ∀-elimination and ∃-introduction
can be applied to any substitutable term, do be denoted by N↓c , and that the
Extension Property still holds. Furthermore v↓ is elementarily equivalent to
a (total) set theoretic structure Iv↓ , whose domain is the set D
Iv of the pure
terms of the language, so that the usual completeness theorem for N↓c immedi-
ately follows. The same applies if v is a valuation with equality, thus obtaining
a correct and complete semantics for N↓=c . Since if v is a totally denoting valua-
tion, then obviously v¯ = v↓, the tv- semantics for N↓c based on v
↓ subsumes the
one based on totally denoting tv-valuations, so that its completeness can also
be inferred from the completeness of the latter. As in the previous case, one can
also immediately infer the usual completeness theorem for N↓=c . That shows
the interest of tv-semantics even if one is concerned only with total classical
logic with or without equality. In particular the standard classical set theoretic
semantics can be rather effectively introduced as a very natural generalization of
tv-totally denoting semantics, by replacing the fixed domain of the pure terms
of the language by an arbitrary non empty set and the total canonical inter-
pretation of the function symbols by their interpretation with arbitrary total
functions on such a set. Concerning the last point, we wish to note the diffi-
culty one faces in motivating the choice of totality, if the classical set theoretic
structures are to be presented as a model of ordinary mathematical structures,
which may carry partial, rather than only total, operations, like the reals with
the x−1 or log function, for example.
1 Conservativeness of partial selection functions
THEOREM 1.1 If D is a formula of L with distinct free variables x1, . . . , xn, y,
and f is an n-ary function symbol not in L, then the conjunction of the following
two formulae is conservative over L with respect to N=c :
ǫ1y(f ;D) ∀(f(x1, . . . , xn) ↓→ ∃yD)
ǫ2y(f ;D) ∀(∃yD → ∃y(y = f(x1, . . . , xn) ∧D))
namely if G1, . . . , Gn, F are formulae of L, f does not occur in G1, . . . , Gn, F
and G1, . . . , Gn, ǫ
1
y(f ;D), ǫ
2
y(f ;D)✄
=
c F , then G1, . . . , Gn✄
=
c F . The same holds
for N=sc .
Proof We deal first with the case in which G1, . . . , Gn, F are pure. By
the correctness and completeness of the tv-semantics with equality for N=c , it
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suffices to show that the Extension Property can be applied to any tv-valuation
with equality v of L, so as to obtain a valuation v′ of L + f which satisfies
ǫ1y(f ;D) and ǫ
2
y(f ;D). If v is not totally denoting, fix a non denoting term
t0 of L and an enumeration of all the parameters of L. If t1, . . . , tn are all
denoting terms of L, ai is the first parameter in the fixed enumeration such that
v(ai = ti) = t and b the first one such that v(D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/b}) = t,
provided there is such a b, we let f(t1, . . . , tn) = b; if on the contrary there is
no b such that v(D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/b}) = t or for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti is non
denoting, then we let f(t1, . . . , tn) = t0. As it is easy to check, f is congruent
with respect to =v, so that the extension v′ of v to L + f , based on f , is a
tv-valuation with equality, and it is also strict. Furthermore v′ satisfies ǫ1y(f ;D)
and ǫ2y(f ;D). Since ǫ
1
y(f ;D) follows in N
=
c from ∀x1 . . .∀xn∀y(f(x1, . . . , xn) =
y → D), it suffices to verify that v′ satisfies the last formula, namely that,
for every n + 1-tuple of parameters a1, . . . , an, b, if v′(f(a1, . . . , an) = b, then
D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/b}) = t By the Extension Property v′(f(a1, . . . , an) =
b) = v(f(a1, . . . , an) = b). Thus from v′(f(a1, . . . , an) = b) = t it follows that
v(f(a1, . . . , an) = b) = t, which, by the definition of f , it can only happen if
v(D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/b}) = t.
As for ǫ2y(f ;D), we have to verify that for every n-tuple of parameters
a1, . . . , an, if v′(∃yD{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an}) = t, then v′(∃y(y = f(a1, . . . , an) ∧
D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an})) = t. From the assumption, by the Extension Prop-
erty it follows that v(∃yD{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an}) = t. Thus there is a parame-
ter b, which we may assume is the first in the given enumeration, such that
v(D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/b}) = t. Therefore f(a1, . . . , an) = b. On the other
hand, v′(∃y(y = f(a1, . . . , an) ∧D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an})) = t if and only if there
is a parameter c such that v′(c = f(a1, . . . , an)∧D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/c}) = t.
By the Extension Property that holds if and only if there is a parameter c such
that v(c = f(a1, . . . , an) ∧D{x1/a1, . . . , xn/an, y/c}) = t. Therefore it suffices
to take b for c to conclude that our claim holds. If v is totally denoting, it
suffices to consider its extension with the ”undefinite” v↑ and replace t0 by ↑
in the previous argument, to obtain the desired extension of v. By the Exten-
sion Property for strict valuation the result applies to N=sc as well. To extend
the result to general formulae it suffices to repeat the argument given for the
extension of the completeness theorem. ✷
1.1 Conservativity of partial description functions
THEOREM 1.2 If D is a formula of L with distinct free variables x1, . . . , xn, y,
and f is an n-ary function symbol not in L, then the following formula is con-
servative over L with respect to N=c :
ιy(f ;D) ∀(f(x1, . . . , xn) = y ≡ D ∧ ∀y
′(D{y/y′} → y′ = y))
The same holds for N=sc .i
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Proof Given D, let D! be D ∧ ∀y′(D{y/y′} → y′ = y). By the proof of the
first part of the previous theorem applied to D!, we can conservatively add the
formula a) ∀(f(x1, . . . , xn) = y → D
!). Furthermore we can conservatively add
ǫ2y(f ;D
!). From D! it logically follows ∃y(D ∧ ∀y′(D{y/y′} → y′ = y)), from
which by ǫ2y(f ;D
!) it follows ∃y(y = f(x1, . . . , xn)∧D∧∀y
′(D{y/y′} → y′ = y)).
Let then z be such that z = f(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ D{y/z} ∧ ∀y
′(D{y/y′} → y′ =
z). From z = f(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ D{y/z} by D
! it follows that z = y hence
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y. Thus also the reverse implication in a), and therefore
ιy(f ;D), is deducible in the conservative extension provided by the previous
theorem with respect to D!. Hence ιy(f ;D) is conservative over L with respect
to N=c . ✷
COROLLARY 1.1 Under the assumption of the previous theorem
∀(f(x1, . . . , xn) = y ≡ D)
is conservative over N=c + UyD where UyD states the uniqueness condition for
y satisfying D, namely ∀(D ∧D{y/y′} → y′ = y).
Proof Under UyD, D∧∀y
′(D{y/y′} ≡ y′ = y) and D are obviously logically
equivalent, so that it suffices to substitute the latter for the former in ιy(f : D),
in the previous theorem. ✷
Directions for further work As we noticed, the notion of strictness we
have adopted is tailored to fit the proposal in [6], to deal with singular terms,
hence in doesn’t assume that if t = t holds, then t is denoting. It would be
interesting to match the present treatment with the more demanding notion
of strictness, by finding an appropriate axiomatization of equality. The tv-
semantic approach to the conservativity of partial description functions and
of partial selection functions, in the latter case under the assumption of the
determinacy of equality, namely the assumption ∀x∀y(x = y ∨ x 6= y), should
be extended to the case of intuitionistic logic. Obviously such questions call
also for a proof theoretic treatment. That requires a preliminary investigation
of logic with equality and the proof of an appropriate subterm and subformula
property (for cut free derivations in a suitable sequent calculus). Joint work
with F. Previale in that direction is well under way.
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